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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 20030494-CA
THOMAS KEVIN ROTHLISBERGER,
Defendant/Appellant.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
I. ADAIR'S TESTIMONY WAS
EXPERT TESTIMONY
The State argues in its brief that Chief Adair's testimony was nothing more than lay
testimony under UT. R. EVID. 701. See, Briefof Appellee at pp. 13-18. First, the State cites
to a 1987 Utah Supreme Court case1 that indicates ". . .that witnesses who testify about
matters that may be subject to scientific analysis are not necessarily expert witnesses under
Rule 702." Id. at pp. 13-14.

UT. R. EVID.

702 clearly indicates that a witness qualified as

an expert may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise through their own "...scientific,
technical or other specialized knowledge" (emphasis added). Appellant's argument that
Adair testified as an expert witness was not under the assumption that the testimony was
1

State v. Ellis. 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987).

"scientific" but that it was within the "specialized knowledge" of Chief Adair. See, Brief of
Appellant at pp. 16-19.
The State inaccurately endeavors to convince this Court that Appellant's reliance upon
U.S. v. McDonald2 is misplaced stating that".. McDonald is readily distinguishable because
the defendant objected to the testimony, not because it was opinion testimony, but because
he claimed it was so-called 'profile9 evidence that improperly invaded the province of the
jury.. .[and].. .because it does not address the question of whether such testimony, although
admissible through an expert, may also be admitted through a lay fact witness, such as Chief
Adair." Brief of Appellee at p. 17. The State mistakenly focuses on the fact pattern of
McDonald, instead of looking to its reliance upon in the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals'
decision on this issue under United States v. Muldrow, 19F.3d 1332,1338 (10th Cir.). Todeem
Adair's testimony as admissible as a "lay fact witness" would require undermining not only
Muldrow. but nearly all of the federal circuits' determinations on the issue.
Nearly all of the federal circuits have recognized that law enforcement testimony
regarding opinions or conclusions pertaining to drug trafficking activities require
"specialized knowledge," as dictated under FED. R. EVID. 702 and replicated under UT. R.
EVID. 702 regarding expert testimony.

The 10th Circuit Court ofAppeals has long recognized

the expert nature of law enforcement officers' testimony when they give their opinions or

2

933 F.2d 1519 (10th Cir.), cert, denied., 502 U.S. 897, 112 S.Ct. 270, 116
L.Ed.2d 222 (1991).
2

conclusions regarding drug trafficking activities3. The recognition, as plainly articulated by the
9 Circuit Court of Appeals, is that testimony regarding such matters calls upon specialized
knowledge and does not relate "to matters 'common enough' to qualify as lay opinion
testimony." United States v. Figueroa-Lopez. 125 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir.1997), cert,
denied, 523 U.S. 1131, 118 S.Ct. 1823, 140 L.Ed.2d 959 (1998). It is well-recognized
throughout the United States that expert testimony on the operations of drug dealers, or drug
trafficking, is appropriate because these matters are not within the common knowledge of the
average juror4.
3

See, e.g., United States v. Diaz-Zappatta. 131 F.3d 152,1997 WL 731790, at *3 (10th
Cir. Nov. 25,1997) (table) (Officer gave expert testimony "regarding the purposes for which
drug dealers bring guns to drug transactions"); United States v. Peach. 113 F.3d 1247,1997 WL
282867, at *3-4 (10th Cir. May 28,1997) (table) (Detective "testified as an expert witness on
crack cocaine sales and the differences between crack cocaine users, user-dealers, and dealers"),
cert, denied, 522 U.S. 974,118 S.Ct. 428,139 L.Ed.2d 329 (1997); United States v. Ouintana, 70
F.3d 1167,1170-71 (10th Cir.1995) (Detective testified as an expert in explaining the drug
jargon *608 used in wiretap evidence); United States v. Muldrow. 19 F.3d 1332,1338 (10th Cir.)
(Officer with "specialized knowledge" gained from education, training and experience in the
investigation of drug trafficking offenses testified as an expert about "drug trafficking in the
community, amounts of cocaine sold on the streets, the prices of cocaine," what qualifies as a
large amount of cocaine, the dangers in transporting large amounts of drugs, and whether a
particular amount was intended for distribution or personal use), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 862,115
S.Ct. 175,130 L.Ed.2d 110 (1994); United States v. Garcia. 994 F.2d 1499,1506 (10th
Cir.l993).(Agent qualified to testify as an expert on the value of methamphetamine labs and an
operator's desire to protect the lab through the use offirearms);United States v. Harris. 903 F.2d
770, 775- 76 (10th Cir. 1990) (FBI agent testified as an expert about whether documents "had
characteristics consistent with records of a drug business").
4

United States v. Bonev. 977 F.2d 624, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1997\: T Inited States v. Romero.
57 F.3d 565, 571 (7th Cir.l995)(Explanations of drug packaging and whether amounts tended
were consistent with personal consumption are subjects about which an average juror may not
know); see also United States v. Tavlor. 18 F.3d 55, 60 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 512 U.S. 1226,
114 S.Ct. 2720,129 L.Ed.2d 845 (1994); United States v. Muldrow. 19 F.3d 1332,1338 (10th
Cir.) (specialized knowledge of law enforcement officer assisted jury in understanding the
significance of the amount omitted); United States v. Lennick. 18 F.3d 814 (9th Cir.)(The length
3

The State's reliance upon its 1987 Utah Supreme Court case and several others outside
this jurisdiction to determine that Adair's testimony is lay witness testimony under UT. R.
EviD. 701 is obviously misplaced. Nearly all of the cases cited by the State in support of
their argument predate the federal cases cited herein in footnotes "3" and "4" above.
Additionally, these cases retain no authority in this jurisdiction, and each are separately
distinguishable in that they do not pertain to the "specialized knowledge" surrounding drug
trafficking. Brief of Appellee at pp. 13-14. The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals and other
federal circuits have undertaken this analysis and have found the "specialized knowledge5'
surrounding drug trafficking to be governed by FED. R. EviD. 702, which is replicated under
UT. R. EVID. 702.

The State then argues that Adair's testimony was admissible testimony by citing to
cases involving analyses of opinion testimony. Brief of Appellee at pp. 15-17. This
misconstrues Appellant's argument, however, by mistakenly leading this Court to believe
Appellant is arguing the "admissibility" of Adair's testimony. Appellant did not challenge
Adair's testimony as being inadmissible because he was offering opinion testimony, but
challenged it based on lack of proper notification of an expert witness under UTAH CODE
ANN.

§77-17-13 and UT. R. CRIM. P. 16.

of time it takes to grow a marijuana plant, the amount of marijuana it takes to make a cigarette
and the amount of marijuana one could obtain from a single plant are matters that are likely to be
outside the scope of most jurors' common knowledge and are properly within the realm of expert
testimony), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 856,115 S.Ct. 162,130 L.Ed.2d 100 (1994); United States v.
Hunter. 95 F.3d 14, 17 (8th Cir.l996)(f,Expert testimony that a certain quantity of drugs suggests
distribution is admissible.") (citation omitted).
4

The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has undeniably held that testimony on the
significance ofanamount ofillegal substance is specialized. U.S.v.Muldrow. 19F.3dl332,
1338 (C.A.10 designates(Kan.),1994). InMuldrow. the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals found
that since the officer testified concerning only his specialized knowledge, and did not go
outside his specialized knowledge by opining about the defendant's intent, then his testimony
was properly admitted as expert testimony. Id. (emphasis added). Adair's testimony
regarding his specialized knowledge of drug trafficking is what designates it as "expert"
testimony. Id.
n. APPELLANT ADEQUATELY PRESERVED
HIS ARGUMENT ON THE
VIOLATION OF UT. R. CRIM. P. 16
The State argues in a footnote to their brief that (a) UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13 governs
over UT. R. CRIM. P. 16 since it deals specifically with the requirements for disclosure of expert
testimony, and (b) Appellant did not properly preserve his argument regarding the violation of UT.
R. CRIM. P. 16 at trial and it can only be addressed by a showing of plain error, which Appellant has
not shown. Briefof Appellee at p. 11, fn. 3. The State's arguments fail since Appellant's argument
was properly preserved at the trial on this matter and is properly challenged on appeal herein5.
5

The State's argument that Appellant would be required to show plain error to have this
issue addressed is also misplaced. The Utah Supreme Court has clearly stated that "[w]hen a
party fails to preserve an issue for appeal, an appellate court will review the issue if the appealing
party can demonstrate plain error or exceptional circumstances; party may also assert ineffective
assistance of counsel in failing to preserve the issue." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, f21, fh. 2,
61 P.3d 1062. Appellant believes this argument was fully preserved at trial; however, if it were
found to not be so, it would be an obvious case of ineffectiveness of counsel for failing to do so.
As articulated in the argument, it is clear that a violation of Rule 16 occurred through the
State's failure to disclose inculpatory evidence. In Appellant's opening brief, Appellant
5

A violation ofUT. R. CRIM. P. 16 occurs when a party wrongfully fails to disclose inculpatory
evidence. State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 921 (Utah 1987). In State v. Perez, 2002 UT App. 211,
52 P.3d 451, this Court determined that the failure to disclose the anticipated testimony of a law
enforcement expert witness was a clear violation of UT. R. CRIM. P. 16. It is apparent that cases such
as the instant one are proper in challenging that a violation of UT. R. CRIM. P. 16 occurred when the
State fails to disclose inculpatory evidence, as occurred here.
UT.

R. CRIM. P. 16 governs discovery in criminal matters and, as argued in Appellant's

opening brief and above, requires the State to produce inculpatory evidence upon request and comply
fully and forthrightly. Brief ofAppellant at pp. 19-21. Co-defendant's trial counsel, William L.
Schultz, initially made the objection to Adair's testimony and Appellant's trial counsel joined in the
objection. Tr. at pp. 104-107. Schultz not only objected based upon the fact that Adair was not
listed on the witness list as an expert, but also based on the fact that there was no notification that
Adair, whether designated an expert or not, was going to express any opinion as to distributional
amounts of drugs. Id at p. 106.
If evidence is disclosed under Rule 16, the prosecutor has a continuing obligation to disclose
newly acquired information so as to avoid misleading the defense. State v. Kallia 877 P.2d 138,143
(Utah 1994). At the preliminary hearing, the State elicited testimony that a combination of the drugs
challenged his trial counsel's ineffectiveness on the limited basis of failure to request a
continuance as a remedy when the statute clearly indicated this as a remedy. Along those same
lines, if Appellant's trial counsel requested the remedy of a Rule 16 violation, but this Court
finds that a specific articulation of an objection under Rule 16 is required, Appellant's trial
counsel's performance once again fell below an objective standard of reasonableness by failing to
so articulate. If Appellant's counsel was ineffective in this manner, prejudice occurred in barring
Appellantfromchallenging the matter on appeal. Hence, both prongs of the Strickland v.
Washington test are satisfied. 466 U.S. 668,104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984).
6

and the drug paraphernalia indicated that it was for distribution. Sometime between the preliminary
hearing and the trial, the State determined that it should elicit more specific and precise information
from Chief Adair regarding the significance of the amount of drugs found, the street price for such
drugs and other aspects of drug trafficking. The State failed to disclose this additional testimony to
Appellant. Schultz objected when the testimony was offered, specifically addressing the failure to
disclose the evidence, and Appellant's trial counsel joined in the objection. Appellant's Rule 16
violation argument was adequately preserved below and should be considered by this Court.
III. THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH
CODE ANN. 77-17-13 REGARDING ADAIR'S TRIAL
TESTIMONY WERE NOT MET BY EBERLING'S
PRELIMINARY HEARING TESTIMONY
The State argues that Appellant received proper notification of Adair's expert testimony
through Officer Eberling' s testimony at the preliminary hearing held in this matter. Brief of Appellee
at pp. 18-21. The State first relies upon a 1985 Utah Supreme Court case6 pertaining to the
substitution of one alibi witness for another. Id. at p. 19. This case is easily distinguishable since
alibi witnesses are not "expert" witnesses with "specialized knowledge." Obviously if two witnesses
can testify to the same circumstance creating an alibi for the defendant, then it would not be unfair
surprise to substitute one for the other. "Specialized knowledge," however, is personal and based
upon extensive background and experience.
The State then points to a non-controlling case from the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals7. Briefof Appellee at pp. 19-20. In this case, the State argues that the "defendant claimed
6

State v. Ortiz, 712 P.2d 218 (Utah 1985).

7

Reed v. U.S., 828 A.2d 159 (D.C. App. 2003)
7

the substitution of new expert violated the state notice statute/9 and that "the trial court
rejected this challenge." Id. An actual reading of this case indicates that the defendant only
made general objections to the expert's qualifications at trial and, on appeal, challenged the
trial court's finding that the expert was qualified. Reed at 163. The D.C. appellate court
found that the government substantially complied with the notification rule, but it was based
not only upon the government's timely letter to defense counsel notifying them of the
substance of the testimony, but also presentation of the witness's curriculum vitae prior to
voir dire. This case is obviously distinguishable from the instant case since there was no
notification whatsoever of Adair's expert testimony, either in the form of a letter or
presentation of a curriculum vitae8.
The State attempts to circumvent the notice requirements of UTAH CODE ANN. §7717-13(1 )(a) by stating that Eberling' s testimony at the preliminary hearing was substantively
identical to Adair's testimony at trial. In essence, the State is arguing the alternative notice
provisions of §77-17-13(5)(a), which indicate as follows:
For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert at a preliminary hearing
held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure constitutes
notice of the expert, the expert's qualifications, and a report of the expert's

8

In the case of an expert witness, in which qualifications go to both admissibility and
weight, a curriculum vitae is material information by which the opposing party's counsel can
challenge the expert's qualifications and credibility. Seivewright v. State, 7 P.3d 24 (Wyo.
2000). The purpose of a curriculum vitae is to allow the opposing party the opportunity to view
that particular expert's qualifications and plan to rebut those, if the opposing party chooses to do
so. Qualifications lend to a question of witness credibility of the expert, which is a question to be
debated and ultimately decided by the trial court and jury.
8

proposed trial testimony as to the subject matter testified to by the expert at the
preliminary hearing.
The State's argument fails, however, for several reasons articulated below.
First, Eberling's testimony at the preliminary hearing was not identical to that offered
by Adair at trial and challenged on appeal by Appellant. The State misquotes Eberling's
testimony stating that Eberling testified that 'the amount seized from the car in which
defendant was riding - nearly 32 grams - was many times the amount needed for personal
use." Brief of Appellee at p. 20. This testimony simply does not exist in the preliminary
hearing transcripts and was fabricated by the State in a feeble attempt to support their
inadequate argument. Transcripts of Preliminary Hearing at pp. 18-19.
Eberling testified that the amount for personal use was "small, small amount in a small
bag." Id He also testified that the quantity found in the passenger door was "saleable," and
with the scales and baggies he believed it to be for distribution. Id. "Saleable" simply infers
that something is able or fit to be sold and is not indicative of either an intent or amount.
Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, "saleable," at www.m-w.com, March 12, 2004.
Eberling's testimony at the preliminaiy hearing indicates that he believed it was for
distribution when coupled with the paraphernalia found in co-defendant, Althoff s gym bag
claimed by her and found in the backseat of the vehicle.
As for Eberling's trial testimony, cited by the State, it is supportive of the idea that
Eberling could not have offered the same testimony elicited from Adair at trial. The colloquy
at trial between Eberling and Appellant's trial counsel was as follows:
9

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A,

I believe, if I can go back, Exhibit No. 1 right here was what you found on the
console, right?
Yes.
That was with a small amount?
Uh-huh.
Is that a characteristic amount of what's sold?
Yes.
It is. What - I mean you testified you believed it was for sale
(inaudible). Do you know how many (inaudible)?
I don't-Is that just one?
I have no idea.

Tr. at p. 64. Eberling appears to be testifying that he is not aware of the significance of the
amount of the drugs found in the console, just that it can be sold. However, it is axiomatic
that any amount of drugs can be sold. This officer's testimony does not point to the
specialized knowledge offered at trial by Adair, who is the chief of police.
Adair's trial testimony was clear and precise based upon his specialized knowledge.
Adair testified that personal use amounts are usually packaged in "quarter or half
grams...maybe even at the most a gram." Tr. at p. 90. He went on to testify that, depending
on the quality, a quarter of a gram usually costs around $40 or $50 in Monticello and that
"some really good crystal" can cost $100 for a half a gram. Id. at pp. 91-92. Adair also
testified that he had seen the kinds of baggies found in the gym bag when he has previously
found methamphetamine and that "usually people that have quantities of drugs have scales."
M a t p. 92.
Adair's testimony differs significantly from that of Eberling's testimony at the
preliminary hearing. Eberling did not offer clear and precise testimony at the preliminary
10

hearing and, when coupled with his testimony at trial, it is questionable whether he even
could have offer the type of testimony elicited from Adair at trial. It is not reasonable to
assume that Eberling's testimony--that a drug is "saleable" and for distribution when coupled
with the apparent distribution paraphernalia- could have reasonably placed Appellant on
notice that Adair would be testifying to the significance of the amount of drugs found, the
street price for such drugs and other aspects of drug trafficking.
Second, the State's argument that Eberling's testimony reasonably put Appellant on
notice of Adair's trial testimony is flawed simply because Eberling is not Adair and Adair
is not Eberling. This Court undertook an analysis of UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13 recently
in State v. Tolano. 2001 UT App. 37, f 18, 19 P.3d 400 and determined as follows:
. , .section 77-17-13 clearly contemplates that the expert take the stand and
provide live testimony because such a provision would enable a party "to
adequately prepare to meet adverse expert testimony." Arellano, 964 P.2d at
1170. Specifically, when an expert testifies at a preliminary hearing, the
adverse party is able to obtain "the name and address of the expert, the expert's
curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's report." Utah Code Ann. § 77-1713(l)(b) (1999). In addition, the opportunity to cross examine the expert
witness enables a party to elicit much more information than the mere notice
requirements of section 77-17- 13. Therefore, we conclude that the 1999
amendment to section 77-17-13 did not overrule Arellano, and an expert must
provide live testimony at the preliminary hearing to satisfy the alternate
notice provision of Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(5)(a) (1999). [FN4]
FN4. Our conclusion is also supported by the plain language of
subsection (5)(b), which states: "Upon request, the party who
called the expert at the preliminary hearing shall provide the
opposing party with a copy of the expert's curriculum vitae as
soon as practicable prior to trial or any hearing at which the
expert may be called as an expert witness." Utah Code Ann. §
77-17-13(5)(b) (1999) (emphasis added). As only a witness. .
11

.may be called, it is clear that the expert(s) must take the
stand at the preliminary hearing in order to satisfy the
notice requirements of section 77-17-13.
Adair took the stand at the preliminary hearing, but did not offer testimony as to the
significance of the amount of drugs or the uses of the drug paraphernalia found. Had the
State elicited this testimony from him during the preliminary hearing, Appellant's trial
counsel would have had the opportunity to obtain "the name and address of the expert, the
expert's curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's report" (UTAH CODE ANN. §77-1713(l)(b)), and elicit much more information under cross-examination than the mere notice
requirements of §77-17-13. Tolano at f 18. Since this testimony was not elicited from Adair
until he was on the stand testifying at the trial, Appellant never obtained the information
under §77-17-13(l)(b) and was not given the opportunity to explore the testimony and the
witness more thoroughly prior to trial.
IV. THE STATE FAILS TO SATISFY
ITS BURDEN TO SHOW THAT THE
ERROR WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL
The State argues that "[e]ven assuming the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting Chief Adair's testimony, defendant cannot show substantial prejudice." Brief of
Appellee at p. 21. The State relies upon State v. Hopkins9 to indicate that the burden of
showing prejudice is on Appellant. Id. However, Hopkins was not a case of violation of
either UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13 or UT. R. CRIM. P. 16, but rather a challenge that the

9

1999 UT 98,1J20, n.3, 989 P.2d 1065.
12

prosecution failed to deliver requested discovery items prior to the preliminary hearing. The
Utah Supreme Court found that Hopkins ".. .failed to demonstrate how he could have plausibly
defeated state's case for probable cause to bind him over for trial," specifically setting forth the
"[p]urpose of preliminary hearing is to decide whether there is probable cause to bind over for trial."
Hopkins at f20. Hopkins is readily distinguishable from the instant case for this reason.
Whether an undisclosed expert witness is challenged under a violation of UT. R. CRIM.
P. 16 or UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13, the burden of showing that prejudice did not occur
falls upon the prosecution. Where the error consists of the failure of the prosecution to
provide a defendant with evidence in violation of UT. R. CRIM. P. 16, the burden is on the
State to persuade the court that the error did not unfairly prejudice the defendant. State v.
Martin. 1999 UT 72, \ 14, 984 P.2d 975, citing State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah
1987). Similarly, this Court shifted the burden to the State regarding a violation of the notice
provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13 to show that the error did not unfairly prejudice
the defendant. State v. Tolano. 2000 UT App 37,1J14, 19 P.3d 400.
Under either violation, the State must show that, despite the errors, the outcome of the
trial merits confidence and there is no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for
the defendant. Knight at 921; Tolano at f 14, citing State v. Arellano. 964 P.2d 1167, 1170
(Utah App. 1998). Because of the difficulties posed by the record's silence in cases
involving a wrongful failure to disclose evidence, when the defendant can make a credible
argument that the prosecutor's errors have impaired the defense, the State must persuade the
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court that the error was harmless. Knight at 921. Since the State mistakenly focuses on the
idea that Appellant has failed to show substantial prejudice, the State fails to even address
its burden at all. Brief of Appellee at pp. 21-22. As argued in Appellant's opening brief, the
failure to disclose Adair's inculpatory expert testimony was prejudicial to Appellant,
resulting in a violation of Appellant's right to a fair trial. Brief of Appellant at pp. 26-27.
V. THE EVIDENCE
WAS INSUFFICIENT
The State argues that Appellant's reliance upon State v. Lavman. 953 P.2d 782 (Utah
App. 1998) is misplaced since the drugs in that case were "discovered in a bag tucked into
the waistband of a passenger in the vehicle and the State produced no evidence that
defendant was even aware of the bag." Brief of Appellee at p. 26. The State goes on to argue
that, although affirmed on certiorari by the Utah Supreme Court10, the analysis contained in
Lavman I was not adopted since the Utah Supreme Court found the alternate reasonable
hypothesis analysis "problematic and unnecessary."
The State bases its argument on the fact that the Utah Supreme Court disapproved of
a mechanical reliance on a list of factors amounting to a checklist, and found those factors
to be only relevant considerations in making the underlying determination. Brief of Appellee
at pp. 26-28. Ironically, the State itself takes issue with only one factor discussed in
Appellant's opening brief- the alternate reasonable hypothesis analysis - and contends that

State v. Lavman. 1999 UT 79,985 P.2d 911.
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Appellant's argument fails based completely on that one factor. Id. It is clear that the State
incorrectly analyzed Layman I and Lavman II.
Layman II did not overrule Layman L but rather affirmed it. While Layman II did take
issue with the alternate reasonable hypothesis analysis in and of itself, it did not completely
overrule its consideration altogether. The Utah Supreme Court articulated its determination
when it stated as follows:
There is nothing wrong with a succeeding court considering factors that were
considered relevant by an appellate court analyzing a factually- similar context.
But both trial and appellate courts need to be mindful that no such list is
exhaustive, and that listed factors are only considerations. The final legal test
is the most generally-worded one: here, whether there was a sufficient nexus
between the defendant and the drugs or paraphernalia to permit a factual
inference that the defendant had the power and the intent to exercise control
over the drugs or paraphernalia. See Fox, 709 P.2d at 318.
Lavman II. at 115.
Appellant's argument was not on one specific factor as the State would contend.
Appellant discussed six (6) separate factors in his opening brief as relevant items to be
considered by this Court in making its ultimate determination; to wit: (1) the circumstantial
evidence failed to sufficiently exclude the alternative hypothesis; (2) Appellant's admitted
use of methamphetamine earlier that day cannot support a conclusion of possession; (3)
actual knowledge and location in vehicle does not prove possession; (4) a jury is not allowed
to indulge in inference upon inference that could lead but to conjecture; (5) the State must
prove case beyond a reasonable doubt; and (6) the jury cannot discredit Tonya's testimony
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and replace it with its belief as to truth of evidence not in the record. Brief of Appellant at
pp. 30-39. These factors all lead to an analysis pertaining to the "sufficient nexus" set forth
by the Utah Supreme Court in Layman II. These six (6) factors lead to a conclusion that
there was not a sufficient nexus between Appellant and the drugs or paraphernalia to permit
a factual inference that Appellant had the power and the intent to exercise control over the
drugs or paraphernalia. Layman II. at 115.
VI. THE PROSECUTOR
MISSTATED THE LAW
The State argues that, "even assuming the prosecutor's remarks were in some way
inaccurate, the jury instructions, which neither party objected to accurately state the
applicable law." Brief of Appellee at p. 31. The State relies upon State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d
475 (Utah 1989), which it analyzes as stating that "any impropriety resulting from
prosecutor's closing-argument remarks was rendered harmless by court's jury instructions."
Id. A reading of Hopkins does not resolve to this conclusion.
In Hopkins, the defense obj ected to the prosecutor's misstatement of law in his closing
arguments. Rather than overruling the objection, as the trial court did in the instant case, the
Hopkins court specifically undertook a colloquy with the jury to ensure that the misstatement
did not mislead them. Specifically it stated as follows:
I would indicate to the jury that you have heard the Court read the law to you, that
you are aware of what the instructions are as far as the law is concerned. And you are
to apply those instructions not to statements or argument that the counsel makes, but
apply the law that the Court has indicated to you to the facts in the case. If it's in
conflict of what they said, you will apply it as the Court has said.
16

Hopkins at 478-479. The Hopkins court did not just assume that the jury had the appropriate
instructions, but went further to instruct them as to what they should apply should the
instructions conflict with the prosecutor's closing remarks.
The State asks this Court to determine that, if the prosecutor's remarks misstated the
law, the jury should just know to rely upon the jury instructions rather than his misstatements.
The trial court in the instant did not take further precautions by specifically instructing the
jury on his misstatements, but simply overruled Appellant's objection. As argued in
Appellant's opening brief, the State's misstatement of the law in closing at trial in this matter
called to the attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in
determining its verdict, and the error was substantial and prejudicial. Statev.Longshaw. 961
P.2d 925, 928 (Utah App. 1998), citing State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah App.
l992)(quoting State v. Peters. 796 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 853 P.2d
897 (Utah 1993); accord State v. Span. 819 P.2d 329,335 (Utah 1991); State v. Bovatt 854
P.2d 50, 554-555 (Utah App.), cert denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993).

[The remainder of this page left intentionally blank]
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CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the trial court's Judgment.
DATED this 15th day of March, 2004.

Barton J. Warren
Attorney for Thomas Kevin Rothlisberger
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 15th day of March, 2004,1 mailed, first class postage
prepaid, true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply Brief to:
Mr. Brett J. Delporto
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
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United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Jose DIAZ-ZAPPATTA and Ulises
Ramos-Fernandez, Defendants-Appellants.
Nos. 96-2256,96-2259.
(D.CNo. CR-95-430-LH)
Nov. 25, 1997.
Before ANDERSON, TACHA and BALDOCK,
Circuit Judges.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT [FN*]
FN* This order and judgment is not
binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral
estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders
and judgments; nevertheless, an order and
judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**1 After examining the briefs and appellate
record, this panel has determined unanimously that
oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P.
34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Codefendants Ulises Ramos-Fernandez and Jose
Diaz-Zappatta appeal from their convictions
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following
a
jury
trial.
[FN1]
Both
Ramos-Fernandez and Diaz- Zappatta were
convicted on one count of conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 846, and on one count of possession
with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of
21
U.S.C.
§
841(a)(1).
Additionally,
Diaz-Zappatta was convicted on a second count of
possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and on two
counts of carrying a firearm during and in relation
to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1). On appeal, Ramos-Fernandez contends
that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction for conspiracy. Diaz-Zappatta contends
that the evidence was insufficient to support his
convictions for carrying a firearm during a drug
trafficking crime. We affirm the convictions of
both defendants.

FN1. Because these two appeals involve
the same underlying facts and testimony,
we have companioned them for our
consideration.

BACKGROUND
Based on information that unnamed persons were
dealing crack cocaine out of an apartment located at
436 Louisiana S.E., Apt. 15, Albuquerque, New
Mexico ("apartment 15"), Albuquerque police
obtained and executed a search warrant for that
address on June 29, 1995. When they arrived, the
apartment door was open. Identifying themselves,
the officers entered and immediately saw four men
who were sitting on sofas in the living room. The
officers ordered the men to stand up. According to
the officers' trial testimony, when defendant Jose
Diaz-Zappatta stood up, there was a loaded
handgun on top of the sofa cushion exactly where
he had been sitting. Although the gun had been
hidden by Diaz-Zappatta's body while he sat, once
he stood, it was plainly visible. [FN2] R. Vol. Ill
at 76-77, 79-80, 83, 98, 143. Detective Sallee,
who was recognized as an expert in the area of
narcotics investigations, testified that a person
would carry a weapon in the vicinity of a drug
transaction to protect the drug deal. Id. at 83.
According to Sallee, "it's very common for one of
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the individuals involved in the deal to bring a
weapon for protection of either his money or his
drugs." Id Sallee further testified that only
Diaz-Zappatta had access to the gun. Id "No one
could get [the handgun] but Mr. Diaz because he
was seated directly on top of it." Id
FN2. Officer Sallee testified as follows
regarding the handgun:
A: When I had Mr. Diaz stand up, I
immediately noticed that there was a
handgun right under where he was seated.
Q: Now, what do you mean by under?
A: He was sitting on top of it. It was on
top of the cushion of the couch, and he was
directly on top of the hand gun.
Q: So was his body, when he stood up and
before he stood up, in direct physical
contact or contact with this weapon?
A: Yes, it was.
Q: There was no cushion, no pillow,
anything?
A: There was nothing in between him and
the gun.
R. Vol. Ill at 76-77.
As the living room occupants were being secured,
two officers entered the back bedroom, where they
encountered Ramos-Fernandez and Lorenzo
Hernandez. The first officer observed Hernandez
drop a bag containing crack cocaine, and he also
observed a large amount of money on the bed. Id
164-65, 86. During the ensuing search, the officers
took pagers from both Ramos-Fernandez and
Hernandez, and they found an envelope addressed
to Ramos-Fernandez at apartment 15. Id. at 121,
127, 166-67.
**2 At that time, the officers arrested
Ramos-Fernandez because he lived at the apartment
and was in the back room with the drugs. [FN3] R.
Vol. Ill at 90. They arrested Diaz-Zappatta
because he was in charge of the firearm, and they
arrested Hernandez because he was in the bedroom
with the crack cocaine. See id. At a later date,
Cesar Cuba-Garcia was arrested. Eventually a
federal grand jury returned a superseding
indictment which charged all four men with various
drug crimes, [FN4] and which also charged
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim
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Diaz-Zappatta with carrying a firearm during and in
relation to drug trafficking crimes. R. Vol. I, Tab
60.
FN3. One of the officers testified that they
concluded Ramos- Fernandez lived at
apartment 15 because of the envelope
addressed to him at the address, and also
because Ramos-Fernandez told another
officer that he resided there. R. Vol. Ill at
105-06.
Ramos-Fernandez's
counsel
asked questions which suggested that the
testifying officer had insufficient personal
information to support the conclusion that
Ramos-Fernandez lived at apartment 15,
but he made no hearsay objection.
FN4. The jury acquitted Cuba-Garcia on
all counts.
Hernandez entered into a plea agreement. At trial,
Hernandez testified that he began dealing drugs in
February 1995. R. Vol. Ill at 184-86. His first
contact was with Diaz-Zappatta and Cuba-Garcia,
and thereafter, he generally purchased the drugs
from Diaz-Zappatta. Id at 185-86, 190. However,
when Diaz-Zappatta was not available, Hernandez
also purchased from Ramos-Fernandez on two or
three occasions and from Cuba-Garcia on two or
three occasions. Id. at 192. Responding to a
specific question about where his purchases from
Ramos-Fernandez took place, Hernandez answered,
"There at his house," in apparent reference to
apartment 15. Mat 222.
According
to
Hernandez,
Diaz-Zappatta,
Ramos-Fernandez, and Cuba-Garcia were dealing
drugs together at apartment 15, id at 191-92, and
they would talk about "the rocks, the money, and
the drugs." Id at 201. Although Diaz- Zappatta
appeared to be the one in charge, it was
Ramos-Fernandez who would contact Hernandez by
calling his pager. Id at 192, 194. During the
period that he was buying drugs from the
codefendants, Hernandez was making about $2,000
profit a month by reselling on the street. Id at 195.
Generally, his transactions with his codefendants
occurred in the same way as the transaction on June
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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29, 1995. Id at 190, 200, 207, 240. Thus, on the
day that police executed the warrant, he had gone to
the apartment to buy drugs which belonged to
Diaz-Zappatta and Ramos-Fernandez. Id. at 197.
On entry, he had greeted Diaz-Zappatta and then
gone to see Ramos-Fernandez as usual. Id. at 200.
When the police arrived, Hernandez was in the
process of counting out the money. Id. at 196-97.
Diaz-Zappatta also testified. Diaz-Zappatta denied
any personal involvement in any drug dealing, and
claimed that he was merely waiting for
Ramos-Fernandez to give him a ride on the day that
he was arrested. Diaz-Zappatta also denied any
knowledge that a drug deal was proceeding between
Ramos-Fernandez and Hernandez, and he further
disputed the testimony that he had been sitting on a
gun. According to Diaz-Zappatta, the police were
not telling the truth when they said that there was a
gun underneath him. R. Vol. IV at 369.
DISCUSSION
Both Ramos-Fernandez and Diaz-Zappatta contend
that the evidence is insufficient to support their
convictions on certain counts. Whether the
evidence is sufficient to support a conviction is a
question of law which we review de novo. United
States v. Dashney, 117 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th
Cir.1997). Viewing the evidence-both direct and
circumstantial, together with the reasonable
inferences drawn therefirom-in the light most
favorable to the government, we must determine
whether " 'any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. In answering this question, we
may neither weigh conflicting evidence nor
consider the credibility of witnesses'." United
States v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 1107, 1108 (10th
Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Pappert, 112
F.3d 1073, 1077 (10th Cir.1997) (citations and
internal quotations omitted)); United States v. Voss,
82 F.3d 1521, 1524-25 (10th Cir.), cert, denied,
117S.Ct.226(1996).
A. Ramos-Fernandez
**3 Ramos-Fernandez contends that the testimony
is not sufficient to establish the existence of a
conspiracy during the times alleged in the
conspiracy count. He complains that, except for
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim
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the date of his arrest, the government presented no
evidence as to the dates of his alleged involvement
in any conspiracy. Thus, he argues that "it would
be an impermissible stretch of credulity to believe
that Hernandez's testimony must relate to the times
alleged in the Indictment." Appellant's Br. at 12.
We disagree.
To obtain a conviction for conspiracy, the
government must prove " '[1] that two or more
persons agreed to violate the law, [2] that the
Defendant knew at least the essential objectives of
the conspiracy, ... [3] that the Defendant knowingly
and voluntarily became a part of it, and [4] that the
alleged coconspirators were interdependent.' "
United States v. Ivy, 83 F.3d 1266, 1285 (10th Cir.)
(quoting United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 66S
(10th Cir.1992)), cert, denied, 117 S.Ct. 253 (1996).
In this case, the indictment charges that the
conspiracy existed from at least April 1995 until
September 1995. R. Vol. I, Tab 60, Count One at
If 1. In relation to Ramos-Fernandez, the
indictment specifically charges overt acts related to
the June 29, 1995, search and arrests. Id. at % 3.
Clearly, Hernandez's testimony provided ample
evidence from which the jury could have found the
essential
elements
of
Ramos-Fernandez's
involvement in a conspiracy to violate drug laws on
June 29, 1995. Moreover, taking the evidence in
the light most favorable to the government, a
reasonable juror
could
have
found
that
Ramos-Fernandez had been engaged in similar acts
over a course of months which spanned the larger
period charged in the indictment. [FN5]
Accordingly, we affirm his conviction.
FN5. Even if this were not the case, a
"variance between an indictment and the
proof may be disregarded if it does not
affect an essential element of the offense
so as to impair substantial rights of the
defendant." United States v. Smith, 838
F.2d 436, 440 n. 1 (10th Cir. 1988)
(citations omitted).

B. Diaz-Zappatta
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Diaz-Zappatta does not appeal his convictions on
the drug charges. Rather, he contends only that the
officers' testimony that he was seated on top of the
gun is insufficient to support his conviction for
carrying a weapon during and in relation to a drug
transaction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically
defined "carry" under § 924, it has given some
guidance which assists our considerations. Thus,
"a firearm can be carried without being used, e.g.,
when an offender keeps a gun hidden in his clothing
throughout a drug transaction." Bailey v. United
States, 116 S.Ct. 501, 507 (1995). Consistent with
Bailey, to obtain a conviction under the "carry"
prong of § 924(c)(1), the government must prove
that the defendant possessed the firearm through
dominion and control, and that he transported or
moved it. United States v. Smith, 82 F.3d 1564,
1568 (10th Cir.1996).
Clearly the officer's testimony that Diaz-Zappatta
was sitting directly on top of the gun, thereby giving
him ready access to it, supports a finding that he
possessed the gun through dominion and control.
Nonetheless, Diaz-Zappatta complains that there
was no evidence linking his possession to the drug
transaction. In particular, he notes that nothing in
Hernandez's testimony concerned guns. The
argument ignores the officer's expert testimony
regarding the purposes for which drug dealers bring
guns to drug transactions. The fact that a drug
transaction was occurring, in the open room
immediately next to where Diaz-Zappatta sat, is
sufficient to support a reasonable juror's inference
that the gun was related to the drug offense.
Moreover, in reviewing for sufficiency of the
evidence, we " 'presume a nexus between a firearm
and a drug trafficking offense when an individual
with ready access to a firearm is involved in such an
offense.' " [FN6] United States v. Baker, 30 F.3d
1278, 1280 (10th Cir.1994) (quoting United States
v. Coslet, 987 F.2d 1493, 1495 (10th Cir.1993)).

FN6. As we noted in Baker:
The "nexus presumption" language used in
our cases in no way changes the
government's burden at trial to prove every
element of a § 924(c)(1) offense.... [T]he
"nexus presumption" language is merely a

JUIU
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tool of appellate review by which this
court judges whether the evidence
introduced at trial, with its accompanying
inferences and viewed in the light most
favorable to the government, is sufficient
to permit a reasonable jury to find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Baker, 30 F.3d at 1280 n. 1.
**4 Finally, Diaz-Zappatta contends that, even if
there were a gun underneath him on the sofa, there
is no evidence that he carried it. Again, viewing
the record in the light most favorable to the
government,
we note
the
evidence that
Diaz-Zappatta was sitting directly on top of the gun.
Although there is no direct evidence that
Diaz-Zappatta placed the gun beneath him in a way
that both hid it and made it readily accessible, the
circumstantial evidence is substantial. That is, in
this case, only Diaz-Zappatta had access to the gun.
From that circumstance, a reasonable juror could
infer that Diaz- Zappatta transported and placed the
gun on the sofa, exactly where he sat. [FN7]
FN7. That Diaz-Zappatta was the only
person with access to, and control over, the
gun readily distinguishes his case from
United States v. Smith, 82 F.3d 1564 (10th
Cir.1996), which involved a handgun
found on the bedroom dresser of a
defendant
who
was
convicted
of
possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1). In Smith, we rejected the
government's assertion "that at some
unknown time, [the defendant] moved the
weapon from some unknown previous
location to the dresser where it was found."
Id at 1568. Finding that there was no
evidence supporting that inference, we
noted that several persons had access to
the firearm and the dresser. Thus, we
concluded that "we can only speculate
whether defendant Smith, or any one of the
several other persons in the house, during
and in relation to the drug trafficking
offense, moved the firearms or placed
them where they were found during the
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search." Id By contrast, in this case, the
evidence demonstrated that the gun was
located in direct contact with DiazZappatta's body, underneath him, where no
one else could access it.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we AFFIRM
the judgment of the district court.
131 F.3d 152 (Table), 1997 WL 731790 (10th
Cir.(N.M.)), 97 CJ C.A.R. 3002 Unpublished
Disposition
END OF DOCUMENT
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United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Michael C. PEACH, Defendant-Appellant.

using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to
a drug trafficking offense, and one count of
unlawful and wilful obstruction of commerce by
robbery.
On December 18, 1994, Wichita Police Officer
Patrick M. Chapman stopped the vehicle driven by
Mr. Peach for making a lefthand turn without
signaling. Officer Chapman then approached the
driver's side of the vehicle and asked Mr. Peach for
his driver's license. As Mr. Peach reached for his
driver's license, Officer Chapman observed the tip
of a plastic baggie between Mr. Peach's legs which
Officer Chapman believed contained crack cocaine.
When a second officer arrived on the scene, Officer
Chapman asked Mr. Peach to exit his vehicle.
When Mr. Peach did so, he left the plastic baggie
on the driver's seat of the vehicle. The second
office then placed Mr. Peach under arrest.

No. 96-3233.
May 28, 1997.
Before BRORBY, EBEL and KELLY, Circuit
Judges.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT [FN*]
FN* This order and judgment is not
binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata
and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders
and judgments; nevertheless, an order and
judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**1 After examining the briefs and appellate
record, this panel has determined unanimously that
oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P.
34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Mr. Michael C. Peach appeals from his convictions
and sentences on two counts of possession with
intent to distribute crack cocaine, two counts of

An inventory search of the vehicle revealed a
loaded Titan Model 380 handgun underneath the
driver's seat and a pager which repeatedly "went
off' during the search. Analysis of the contents of
the plastic baggie revealed it contained 1.41 grams
of crack cocaine.
On February 7, 1995, two officers of the Wichita
Police Department on routine patrol observed a
vehicle driven by a black male traveling southbound
on Broadway at a high rate of speed. The officers
observed the vehicle's front windshield was cracked
and decided to stop the vehicle.
As the officers exited their patrol car, the driver of
the detained vehicle, Mr. Peach, got out of his
vehicle. The officers told Mr. Peach to get back
into his vehicle. However, Mr. Peach turned and
ran from the scene. During the ensuing chase, the
pursuing officer observed Mr. Peach place his right
hand on what the officer believed to be the butt on a
handgun and drop the weapon on the ground.
When the officer finally tackled Mr. Peach, he
observed Mr. Peach trying to stuff a plastic baggie
into his mouth. The officers then retrieved the
plastic baggie, which contained eight "rocks" of
crack cocaine weighing 1.19 grams, and a loaded .9
mm. Ruger P 89 handgun. The officers also
recovered a dark colored pager and $168 from Mr.
Peach's person. An inventory search of the vehicle

Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

113 F.3d 1247 (Table)
Unpublished Disposition

Page 2

(Cite as: 113 F.3d 1247,1997 WL 282867 (10th Cir.i
revealed a registration card indicating Mr. Peach
had recently purchased the vehicle and a pink pager.
On April 103 1995, a black male entered Jimmie's
Diner at 3111 N. Rock Road, Wichita, Kansas, with
a handgun and demanded money while holding a
hostage around the neck with the handgun jammed
into her ribs. The robber obtained approximately
$300 in cash and change from the cash register in a
maroon bank bag. He then fled in a blue Ford
Taurus.
**2 Officers responding to the robbery call noticed
a vehicle fitting the description of the robber's
vehicle traveling westbound on 32nd Street and
gave chase. The officers eventually stopped the
vehicle and took both occupants of the vehicle to
the scene of the robbery for identification. The
hostage, an employee of Jimmie's Diner, identified
Mr. Peach as the robber.
On the ground near where the vehicle stopped,
officers found a Marksman BB gun pistol and
brown pants turned inside out with $202 in cash in
the pockets, which was separated by denomination.
In the vehicle, officers found rolled coins and fifty
wrapped $1 bills along with a maroon bank bag
belonging to Jimmie's Diner.
On April 19, 1995, the grand jury returned a
five-count indictment against Mr. Peach. Counts I
and III charged Mr, Peach with possession with
intent to distribute cocaine base (crack cocaine), in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994) and 18
U.S.C. § 2 (1994), on December 18, 1994, and
February 7, 1995, respectively. Counts II and IV
charged him with unlawfully carrying or using a
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking
offense, namely possession of crack cocaine with
intent to distribute, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
924(c) and 2 (1994), on December 18, 1994, and
February 7, 1995, respectively. Count V charged
him with unlawfully, knowingly and willfully
obstructing, delaying, and affecting commerce and
attempting to obstruct, delay, and affect commerce
by robbing Jimmie's Diner on April 10, 1995, by
means of actual and threatened violence, force, and
fear of injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 and
2(1994).
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Prior to trial, the district court denied Mr. Peach's
motion to dismiss Count V, but granted his motion
to sever Count V from the remaining counts. On
October 18, 1995, Mr. Peach proceeded to trial on
Counts I through IV. A jury convicted him on all
four counts on October 19, 1995.
On January 17, 1996, as a result of the Supreme
Court's decision in Bailey v. United States, 116
S.Ct. 501 (1995), the district court granted Mr.
Peach a new trial on Count II, using or carrying a
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking
offense. The district court denied Mr. Peach's
motion for a new trial on Counts I, III, and IV. The
court then sentenced Mr. Peach to thirty-six months
imprisonment on Counts I and III, to run
concurrently, and sixty months imprisonment on
Count IV, to run consecutively to his sentences for
Counts I and III.
On March 19-20, 1996, Mr. Peach was retried on
Count II and found guilty. On April 3, 1996, the
district court denied Mr. Peach's renewed motion
for acquittal.
On May 21, 1996, Mr. Peach was tried on Count
V. The jury convicted him on May 22, 1996.
On June 17, 1996, the
Peach to twenty years
and sixty-three months
both sentences to run
sentences.

district court sentenced Mr.
imprisonment on Count II
imprisonment on Count V,
consecutively to his prior

On appeal, Mr. Peach contends: (1) in his first
trial, the district court erred in allowing Detective
Fettke to testify as an expert on drug dealers and
regarding a conversation Detective Fettke had with
him in December 1994; (2) the evidence was
insufficient to sustain his convictions on Counts I
and III; (3) the district court erred in failing to give
a jury instruction on aiding and abetting as charged
in the indictment in Counts I through IV; and (4)
the district court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute
him on Count V. [FN 1]

FN1. In his reply brief, Mr. Peach asserts
for the first time the evidence was
insufficient to convict him on Count V and
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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that the district court erred in giving an
aiding and abetting instruction on Count V.
We will not address these issues, however,
because issues raised for the first time in
the reply brief are deemed waived and will
not be considered. See Codner v. United
States, 17 F.3d 1331, 1332 n. 2 (10th
Cir.1994).
**3 As a preliminary matter, we address the
government's assertion we lack jurisdiction to
consider Mr. Peach's claims related to his
convictions on Counts I, III, and IV because his
notice of appeal was untimely. The government's
argument is wholly without merit. A notice of
appeal must be filed within ten days of the entry of
the judgment appealed from. Fed. R.App. P. 4(b).
For the purposes of Fed. R.App. P. 4(b), a judgment
is entered "when it is entered on the criminal
docket." Id. Although the judgment on Counts I,
III, and IV was filed January 30, 1996, it was
entered on the criminal docket sheet on January 31,
1996. Therefore, Mr. Peach's February 12, 1996,
filing of a notice of appeal was timely. See Fed.
R.App. P. 26(a) ("The last day of the period so
computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday,
a Sunday, or a legal holiday, ... in which event the
period runs until the end of the next day which is
not one of the aforementioned days."). [FN2]
FN2. This appeal was docketed as No.
96-3054 and dismissed for lack of finality
on August 26, 1996, by a jurisdictional
panel of this court.
I.
Mr. Peach contends that at the October 1995 trial
on Counts MV:(a) the district court erred in
allowing Detective Fettke to testify as an expert on
crack cocaine sales and differences between drug
dealers and simple drug users, and (b) the district
court prejudiced his defense and denied him his
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by permitting
Detective Fettke to testify regarding a conversation
Detective Fettke had with him in December 1994.

.)))
a.
Mr. Peach contends the district court erred in
allowing Detective Fettke to testify as an expert
witness. "The determination of whether expert
testimony should be admitted rests with the sound
discretion of the [district] court." United States v.
Esch, 832 F.2d 531, 535 (10th Cir.1987), cert,
denied, 485 U.S. 908 (1988). Therefore, we defer
to the district court and review its determination
only for abuse of that discretion. Id.
At the first trial in October, 1995, Detective Fettke
testified as an expert witness on crack cocaine sales
and the differences between crack cocaine users,
user-dealers, and dealers based on his training and
experience in the sale of narcotics. [FN3] Detective
Fettke testified to his extensive training and
experience in drug sales during his eleven years
with the Wichita Police Department. Thereafter,
he testified the "normal" crack cocaine user only
possesses: one $20 "rock" of crack cocaine, which
weighs approximately 0.10 grams; a crack pipe;
and a lighter or a torch to provide the high heat
necessary to vaporize the cocaine. Detective
Fettke testified users usually do not carry more than
$20-$40 with them and usually do not cany
firearms for protection. He testified a user
normally only carries firearms to be pawned or
traded for cocaine. Finally, Detective Fettke
testified crack cocaine users usually do not have any
money or any valuable possessions, because they
spend all their money on and trade all their
possessions for more cocaine.
FN3. Although the district court did not
formally accept Detective Fettke as an
expert witness, the court knew the
prosecution offered him as an expert
witness, heard him describe his
qualifications and then allowed him to give
his opinion testimony. We therefore
assume the court accepted Detective Fettke
as an expert witness. See United States v.
McDonald, 933 F.2d 1519, 1522 n. 2 (10th
Cir.), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 897 (1991).
In regard to user-dealers, Detective Fettke testified
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user-dealers often carry firearms with them;
occasionally have pagers to make them more
accessible to their buyers; and normally do not
carry their crack pipes and drug usage paraphernalia
with them. He noted user-dealers usually have
"some of the nicer things that go along with dealing
cocaine."
**4 The proper inquiry concerning expert
testimony is whether the jury is able to understand
the evidence without the specialized knowledge
available from the testimony of the expert witness.
United States v. McDonald, 933 F.2d at 1522. In
this case, the basic facts were the amount of crack
cocaine found in plastic baggies, 1.41 and 1.19
grams, coupled with the possession of loaded
firearms, pagers, and over $100 in cash. Without
understanding the drug trade and how a drug dealer
works, a jury could not be expected to understand
the significance of this evidence. McDonald, 933
F.2d at 1522. Detective Fettke provided the
specialized knowledge needed to understand the
evidence presented. Therefore, we hold the district
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing
Detective Fettke to testify as an expert witness.
b.
Mr. Peach asserts the district court prejudiced his
defense and denied him his Sixth Amendment right
to a fair trial by permitting Detective Fettke, over
Mr. Peach's objections, to testify regarding a
conversation Detective Fettke had with him in
December 1994.
During the government's case-in-chief, the
government called Detective Fettke to testify that
Mr. Peach told him he "does not distribute or use
crack cocaine." Detective Fettke's testimony was
presented to refute Mr. Peach's defense that he was
a simple user of cocaine and not a dealer. The
district court found this testimony relevant and
concluded its probative value was not outweighed
by the prejudice to Mr. Peach. Immediately
following Detective Fettke's testimony, the district
court instructed the jury that the testimony could
only be used for the purpose of determining whether
Mr. Peach possessed the necessary intent to
distribute crack cocaine and not for the purpose of
whether Mr. Peach was engaged in an illegal
Copr. ©West 2004 No CI
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transaction when the conversation took place.
"We review both the district court's determination
of the relevancy of the evidence and its conclusion
that the probative value of the evidence is not
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect for
an abuse of discretion." United States v. Flanagan,
34 F.3d 949, 952 (10th Cir.1994).
Federal Rule of Evidence 401 provides that
relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence." Mr. Peach did not dispute his
possession of 1.41 and 1.19 grams of crack cocaine
on December 18, 1994, and February 7, 1995,
respectively. Rather, his defense centered on his
being a simple user of crack cocaine and not a
distributor. Therefore, Detective Fettke's testimony
was relevant to Mr. Peach's intent to use or to
distribute the crack cocaine in his possession.
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides relevant
evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice." The evidence here was certainly
damaging to Mr. Peach's defense: it refuted his
assertions that he was a simple user of crack
cocaine and not a dealer, and it showed additional
involvement with the police. However, it did not
rise to the level of unfair prejudice. "[T]he unfair
prejudice aspect of Rule 403 'cannot be equated
with testimony which is simply unfavorable to a
party. It must be unfair in the sense that it would
be misleading and not aid and assist the jury in
making a material determination in the case.' "
Flanagan, 34 F.3d at 953 (quoting McEwen v. City
of Norman, 926 F.2d 1539, 1549-50 (10th Cir.1991)
). Accordingly, we hold the district court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting Detective Fettke's
testimony regarding the conversation he had with
Mr. Peach in December 1994.
II.
**5 Mr. Peach contends there was insufficient
evidence to support his convictions on Counts I and
III for possession of crack cocaine with intent to
distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
l to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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Mr. Peach asserts he is merely a user of cocaine, not
a distributor.
To obtain a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
for possession with intent to distribute crack
cocaine, the government must establish Mr. Peach
(1) possessed crack cocaine; (2) knew he possessed
crack cocaine; and (3) intended to distribute the
crack cocaine. See United States v. Wilson, 107
F.3d 774, 778 (10th Cir.1997). Mr. Peach does not
claim he did not knowingly possess crack cocaine.
Mr. Peach challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to establish he intended to distribute the
crack cocaine rather than use it personally.
We review the record for sufficiency of the
evidence de novo. Wilson, 107 F.3d at 778. "
'Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if a
reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, given the direct and
circumstantial evidence, along with reasonable
inferences therefrom, taken in a light most favorable
to the government.' " Id. (quoting United States v.
Mains, 33 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir.1994)).
"Rather than examining the evidence in 'bits and
pieces,1 we evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence
by 'considering] the collective inferences to be
drawn from the evidence as a whole.' " Wilson, 107
F.3d at 778 (quoting United States v. Hooks, 780
F.2d 1526, 1532 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 475 U.S.
1128 (1986)). Thus, we must affirm the conviction
if the "collective inferences" from the totality of the
evidence could have led a reasonable jury to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Peach intended
to distribute the crack cocaine he possessed.
In reviewing the record, we hold there was
sufficient evidence to establish Mr. Peach's intent to
distribute the crack cocaine found in his possession
on December 18, 1994, and February 7, 1995. The
evidence demonstrated: Mr. Peach possessed 1.41
and 1.19 grams of crack cocaine on December 18,
1994, and February 7, 1995, respectively; he did
not have with him any paraphernalia associated with
drug use on either occasion; on February 7, 1995,
he was carrying $168 in cash on his person; on
both occasions, he possessed at least one pager;
and on both occasions he possessed a loaded
firearm. Considering the expert testimony of
Detective Fettke, evidence indicates intent to
Copr. ©West 2004 No C
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distribute crack cocaine. Furthermore, this court
has indicated the presence of firearms in connection
with drugs, as with the two firearms in this case,
may be probative evidence of an intent to distribute
the drugs. See United States v. Hager, 969 F.2d
883, 888 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 506 U.S. 964
(1992). Taken as a whole, the evidence was
sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude beyond
a reasonable doubt that Mr. Peach possessed crack
cocaine with the intent to distribute.

m.
**6 Mr. Peach contends the district court erred in
failing to give an aiding and abetting instruction on
Counts I through IV. Mr. Peach argues that in order
for the jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
all elements of the offenses charged must be given
to the jury and, thus, failing to give an aiding and
abetting instruction as charged in the indictment is
per se reversible error, especially when the
evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
support the charges of aiding and abetting in the
indictment. Mr. Peach asserts the district court
constructively amended the indictment by omitting
the aiding and abetting charges from its reading of
the indictment to the jury and from its jury
instructions. [FN4]
FN4. From the record before us, we cannot
discern whether the district court actually
read the redacted indictment to the jury in
addition to submitting a written copy to the
jury in the jury instructions. However, the
distinction is irrelevant to our analysis. Our
holding would be the same whether the
district court read the redacted indictment
to the jury, simply allowed the jury to have
a copy thereof in the jury instructions, or
both.
Because Mr. Peach did not object to the district
court's omitting the aiding and abetting instruction,
we review only for plain error. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b)
. See United States v. DeSantiago-Flores, 107
F.3d 1472, 1479 (10th Cir.1997). "Plain error is
one that 'affects the defendant's right to a fair and
impartial trial.' " United States v. Galbraith, 20
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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F.3d 1054, 1057 (10th Cir.) (quoting United States
v. Smith, 13 F.3d 1421, 1424 (10th Cir.), cert,
denied, 513 U.S. 878 (1994)), cert denied, 513
U.S. 889 (1994). "It must have been both 'obvious
and substantial.' " Id. at 1057 (quoting Smith, 13
F.3datl424).
In this case, the district court's omission of the
aiding and abetting charges from the reading of the
indictment to the jury and from the jury instructions
ensured Mr. Peach received a fair trial as he was the
only person charged in the indictment. Therefore,
there can be no error in the district court's actions.
Next, Mr. Peach is correct that the jury must find a
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all
elements of the offense charged. See Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-78 (1993) (a criminal
conviction must rest upon a jury determination that
the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
each element of the offense charged). However,
aiding and abetting is a separate offense with its
own elements under 18 U.S.C. § 2, and not an
element of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), possession with
intent to distribute a controlled substance, or of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), using or carrying a firearm
during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense.
See Wilson, 107 F.3d at 778 (discussing elements of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)); United States v. Ruth, 100
F.3d 111, 112-13 (10th Cir.1996) (discussing
elements of § 924(c)(1)); United States v. Yost, 24
F.3d 99, 104 (10th Cir. 1994) (discussing elements
of 18 U.S.C. § 2). Therefore, a court need not
instruct a jury on aiding and abetting in order to
instruct on all the elements of possession with intent
to distribute or using or carrying a firearm during
and in relation to a drug trafficking offense. In
fact, it would be error for the district court to allow
an aiding and abetting instruction simply because
the charge was included in the indictment where, as
in this case, the evidence presented at trial does not
support such a charge. See United States v. Martin,
747 F.2d 1404, 1407-08 (11th Cir. 1984).
**7 Finally, we review whether the district court
constructively amended the indictment by omitting
the aiding and abetting instruction.
A constructive amendment occurs "if the
evidence presented at trial, together with the jury
instructions, raises the possibility that the
Copr. ©West 2004 No C
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defendant was convicted of an offense other than
that charged in the indictment." "The specific
inquiry is whether the jury was permitted to
convict the defendant upon 'a set of facts
distinctly different from that set forth in the
indictment.'"
Galbraith, 20 F.3d at 1058 (quoting Hunter v.
New Mexico, 916 F.2d 595, 599 (10th Cir.1990),
cert, denied, 500 U.S. 909 (1991)).
The key to constructive amendment is the
defendant's conviction of an offense not charged in
the indictment. Since it is impossible for the jury
to have convicted Mr. Peach on a charge which was
not even presented to them, the district court's
omission of the aiding and abetting charges did not
constructively amend the indictment. If anything,
the district court's omissions amounted to a
judgment of acquittal on the aiding and abetting
charges.
IV.
Mr. Peach contends the district court lacked
jurisdiction to prosecute him under the Hobbs Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1951, for the April 10, 1995, robbery
of Jimmie's Diner. Mr. Peach asserts the
government "seized" his case from Kansas
authorities in violation of his civil and constitutional
rights. Finally, Mr. Peach argues the government
selectively prosecuted him. [FN5] We review
challenges to jurisdiction de novo. F.D.I.C. v.
Hulsey, 22 F.3d 1472,1479 (10th Cir.1994).
FN5. He also perfunctorily asserts the
district court lacked personal jurisdiction
over him. Because he fails to develop this
issue, we decline to review this claim.
Murrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388, 1389 n.
2 (10th Cir.1994).
"The Hobbs Act provides for the punishment of
anyone who 7/i any way or degree obstructs, delays,
or affects commerce or the movement of any article
or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion
or attempts or conspires so to do.' " United States
v. Zeigler, 19 F.3d 486, 489 (10th Cir.) (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 1951(a)), cert denied, 513 U.S. 1003
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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(1994) (emphasis in original). Under the Act,
commerce includes " 'all commerce between any
point in a State, ... and any point outside thereof; ...
and all other commerce over which the United
States has jurisdiction.' " Id (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
1951(b)(3)).
"Consistent with this broad statutory language, ...
the 'jurisdictional predicate of the Hobbs Act can be
satisfied by a showing of "any de minimis effect on
commerce." ' " United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d
396, 398 (10th Cir.1995) (quoting Zeigler, 19 F.3d
at 489), cert denied, 116 S.Ct. 966 (1996). "In
order to establish the requisite de minimis effect on
commerce, the government need only produce
evidence establishing that the assets of a business
engaged in interstate commerce were depleted
during the commission of the crime." Id.

claim is waived.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Mr.
Peach's convictions and sentences on all counts.
113 F.3d 1247 (Table), 1997 WL 282867 (10th
Cir.(Kan.)) Unpublished Disposition
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During the trial on Count V, the Hobbs Act charge,
the government presented evidence establishing that
the robbery of Jimmie's Diner depleted the assets of
business
engaged
in
interstate
commerce.
Specifically, the government demonstrated the
money taken in the robbery would have been used
to purchase supplies for the diner from Wonder
Hostess in St. Louis, Missouri; Milani Foods in
Charlotte, North Carolina; Mid-Central/SYSCO in
Kansas City, Missouri; and Meadow Gold in
Dallas, Texas. This evidence is sufficient to
demonstrate a de minimis effect on interstate
commerce under the Hobbs Act. See Bolton, 68
F.3d at 399; Zeigler, 19 F.3d at 491-93.
Therefore, we hold the district court had
jurisdiction to prosecute Mr. Peach for violating the
Hobbs Act.
**8 Finally, Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(1) requires a
defendant to raise "objections based on defects in
the institution of the prosecution" prior to trial. "A
selective prosecution claim clearly qualifies as such
an objection." United States v. Bryant, 5 F.3d 474,
476 (10th Cir.1993). Furthermore, Fed.R.Crim.P.
12(f) presumes these objections are waived if they
are not raised prior to trial; a presumption which
can be overcome with a showing of cause. The
record in this case indicates Mr. Peach failed to
raise selective prosecution prior to trial and he
failed to show cause for this untimeliness.
Accordingly, Mr. Peach's selective prosecution
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